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"That the Laws be Faithfully Executed": 
The Perils of the Government Legal Advisor 
DAVID LUBAN• 
This morning I am going to speak to you about a neglected but 
extremely important role that government lawyers play: as confidential 
advisors to their agency or military clients about what the law requires of 
them. I am going to discuss those requirements through a case study of 
failure: the government lawyers whose legal opinions gave a green light to 
torture. This is obviously a pretty unusual case, loaded with melodrama. 
But I think there are lessons in it for every lawyer who takes on the 
advisor's role. 
Suppose you practice business law. Your client comes to you and says 
"We have a major deal in the works. It is aggressive and cutting edge, and 
we need an opinion from you saying that it is legal." Obviously, you cannot 
promise that. First, you need to know what the deal is. So, you examine the 
documents and carefully analyze the law. Unfortunately, you have only bad 
news to report: the deal is illegal, and there is no way to fix it. But with a 
little creative stretching of the law and some body English you could make a 
case for it that might, just might, pass the laugh test-but only barely. What 
do you do? Should you stretch the law and write the opinion that your 
client dearly wants? 
" University Professor in Law and Philosophy, Georgetown University Law Center; Bacon-
Kilkenny Distinguished Visiting Professor of Law, Fordham Law School. This Article is an elaboration 
of the Carhart Lecture presentation at the Ohio Northern University Pettit College of Law on March 2, 
2012. I have retained something of the spoken character of the lecture. 
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If you were writing a brief, the answer would be straightforward under 
the ethics rules, and it would be yes. An advocate can make any argument 
"that is not frivolous."1 Therefore, you could and should throw your Hail 
Mary pass and hope for the best-remember that we are stipulating that it 
passes the laugh test, meaning that it is not frivolous. As the predecessor of 
the current Model Rules of Professional Conduct explains, "While serving 
as advocate, a lawyer should resolve in favor of his client doubts as to the 
bounds of the law."2 It adds: "The advocate may urge any permissible 
construction of the law favorable to his client."3 
Almost certainly that is what you would like to be able to do for your 
client in your legal opinion.4 The client stands to make a lot of money from 
the deal and needs your blessing for it to go forward. Elihu Root, an 
eminent corporate lawyer of a century ago who later became Secretary of 
State, famously said, "The client never wants to be told that he can't do 
what he wants to do; he wants to be told how to do it, and it is the lawyer's 
business to tell him how."5 
The trouble is that what is ethical for a courtroom advocate may not be 
ethical for an advisor. Model Rule 2.1 of the Model Rules of Professional 
Conduct governs the advisor's role, and it requires you to "exercise 
independent professional judgment and render candid advice."6 
Independent does not mean only independence from outside influences. It 
also includes independence from your client's pressure. And candid means 
just what it sounds like. In the words of the American Bar Association, "a 
lawyer should not be deterred from giving candid advice by the prospect 
that the advice will be unpalatable to the client. "7 That means offering 
"straightforward advice expressing the lawyer's honest assessment."8 In 
other words, your job may be to give the client bad news. You must tell it 
straight, without slanting or skewing. That can be a difficult thing to do if 
the legal answer is not the one that the client wants. No lawyer ever enjoys 
I. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.1 (2009) [hereinafter MODEL RULES). 
2. MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-3 (1980) [hereinafter MODEL CODE]. 
3. Id. EC 7-4. 
4. I do not mean to deny that a conscientious lawyer might have moral qualms about approving 
the deal, if it puts innocent third parties at risk. On the contrary, I believe that lawyers ought to have 
moral qualms, regardless of how permissive the ethics rules are. In some cases, lawyers should turn 
down cases or tactics on moral grounds even if the rules permit the representation. But let us imagine 
that this particular hypothetical deal is very unlikely to harm anyone. 
5. 1 [THE PREDECESSOR FIRMS 1819-1906) ROBERT T. SWAINE, THE CRAVATH FIRM AND ITS 
PREDECESSORS, 1819-1947, at 667 (1946). 
6. MODEL RULES, supra note I, R. 2.1. 
7. !d. R. 2.1 cmt. I. The rule itself states: "In representing a client, a lawyer shall exercise 
independent professional judgment and render candid advice." /d. R. 2.1. 
8. /d. R. 2.1 cmt. I. 
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saying no to a valued client. But the ethical standard is clear: a legal 
advisor must use independent judgment and give candid, unvarnished 
advice. 
A moment's thought will show us why. An advocate functions in an 
adversary system with a lawyer on the other side to present all the opposing 
arguments, and an impartial judge to decide whose case is stronger. The 
advisor's role is structurally different. Typically the lawyer gives her 
advice in a confidential and privileged communication with the client. 
Nobody else is in the room. It is just you and your client, sitting across a 
desk from each other. No adversary will argue the other side, and no 
impartial judge will pick the strongest argument. What you say is the law. 
If you simply tell your client whatever he or she wants to hear, you make 
the law into a joke. 
This is common sense. Otherwise, clients could go to their lawyers and 
say, "Give me an opinion that says I can do what I want"-and then duck 
responsibility by saying, "My lawyer told me it was legal." Then we would 
have a perfect circle of nonaccountability: the lawyer says "I was just doing 
what my client wanted," and the client says, "I was just doing what my 
lawyer approved." The damage to law, and compliance with law, would be 
enormous. 
In my view, the standard for candid, independent advice cashes out in 
two important rules of thumb. 9 Number One is that the legal opinion you 
give your client should be more or less the same as it would be if your client 
wanted the opposite from what you know she actually wants. If it is not, it 
means that you have allowed your advice to be slanted by the outcome you 
aimed to reach. Number Two is that your legal opinion-given in 
confidence-should be one you could live with even if Wikileaks puts it on 
the Internet for all to see. 10 If your opinion does not obey these two rules of 
thumb, you should slam on the brakes, because it probably means you have 
failed in your ethical duty of candor and independence. 
What I have said so far holds for lawyers in any form of law practice. 
That includes government lawyers, who are bound by the same ethics rules 
as their counterparts in private practice. 
9. I discuss these rules of thumb further in David Luban, Tales of terror: lessons for lawyers 
from the 'war on terrorism', in REAFFIRMING LEGAL ETHICS: TAKING STOCK AND NEW IDEAS 56, 61-63 
(Kieran Tranter et al. eds., 2010). 
I 0. Here I am drawing on an important idea of Immanuel Kant, who declared that "[a ]II actions 
affecting the rights of other human beings are wrong if their maxim is not compatible with their being 
made public." IMMANUEL KANT, Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch, in KANT'S POLITICAL 
WRITINGS 126 (H. S. Reiss ed., 2d ed. 1991). Kant calls this formula an "experiment of pure reason," 
that is, a thought experiment to tell right from wrong. For discussion, see David Luban, The Publicity 
Principle, in THE THEORY OF INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN 154 (Robert E. Goodin ed., 1996). 
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I want to illustrate what I have been saying with a case study. I choose 
it because it is what first got me thinking about how important the 
distinction is between the advocate's and advisor's roles. Additionally, it is 
a case that I followed closely for six years, starting when it first hit the 
newspapers in 2004, up to the final government report on it in 2010. 
It is the case of what have come to be known as the "torture memos": 
legal opinions written by the Justice Department's elite Office of Legal 
Counsel ("OLC") on the permissibility of using very harsh tactics in 
interrogating so-called "high value" AI Qaeda prisoners. All told, there 
were six OLC torture memos, two in 2002, one in 2004, and three in 2005.11 
All of them confronted a host of legal issues about torture-issues about 
statutory interpretation, international treaties, criminal defenses, and 
executive power. Ultimately, they gave interrogators the green light on 
every one of them, no matter how unlikely the argument was. 12 
How harsh were the interrogation tactics we are talking about? The 
most often discussed tactic is waterboarding, which is a controlled partial 
drowning. 13 Waterboarding causes intense physical and mental panic 
responses withln a few seconds, and those who have experienced it describe 
it as unbearable.14 But waterboarding is not the only method used by CIA 
and other interrogators. For example, the torture memos also approved 
sleep deprivation, brought about by chaining detainees to the ceiling with 
loose chains that made it impossible to lie down and equally impossible to 
do anything but stand up on their own power. 15 The prisoners were naked 
and diapered, and OLC approved up to 180 hours of sleep deprivation-
11. See THE TORTURE MEMOS: RATIONALIZING THE UNTHINKABLE 41, 106, 128, 152, 199, 225 
(David Cole ed., 2009) (hereinafter THE TORTURE MEMOS]. 
12. I have analyzed the torture memos in DAVID LUBAN, The torture lawyers of Washington, in 
LEGAL ETHICS AND HUMAN DIGNITY 162 (2007), and in my Senate testimony: What Went Wrong: 
Torture and the Office of Legal Counsel in the Bush Administration: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on 
Admin. Oversight and the Courts of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 11-14, 47-50, 290-95 
(2009) (statement of David Luban, Prof. of Law, Geo. U. L. Center) [hereinafter Senate Testimony]. See 
also David Cole, The Sacrificial Yoo: Accounting for Torture in the OPR Report, 4 J. NAT'L SECURITY 
L. & POL'Y 455,457-59 (2010). 
13. See Malcolm Nance, Waterboarding is Torture ... Period, SMALL WARJ. (Oct. 31,2007,2:30 
PM), http://smallwarsjoumal.comlblog/waterboarding-is-torture-period-links-updated-9 (providing a 
description of wateboarding, by a former US Navy instructor who "personally led, witnessed, and super-
vised the waterboarding of hundreds of people."); see also Memorandum from Steven G. Bradbury, 
Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep't of Justice, Office of Legal Counsel, to John A. 
Rizzo, Senior Deputy Gen. Counsel, Cent. Intelligence Agency (May 10, 2005) (hereinafter Memoran-
dum from Steven G. Bradbury to John A. Rizzo], reprinted in THE TORTURE MEMOS, supra note 11, at 
152. 
14. See Nance, supra note 13. 
15. Memorandum from Steven G. Bradbury to John A. Rizzo, supra note 13. 
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seven days and seven nights-which in fact was the treatment given to one 
detainee. 16 
The legal meaning of torture is the intentional infliction of severe 
mental or physical pain or suffering. 17 Obviously, that is a vague standard: 
how severe is severe? Vague or not, though, it certainly means something. 
Anyone who has given birth to a baby or gotten kicked in the wrong place 
knows what severe pain is. Personally, I have no doubt that waterboarding 
and prolonged sleep deprivation inflict severe suffering and count as torture. 
The Supreme Court has described sleep deprivation as torture, and likened a 
36-hour interrogation to '"the inquisition of the Middle Ages. "'18 So too, 
the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals described an interrogation technique 
identical to waterboarding as torture. 19 But the OLC memos concluded the 
opposite. 
The most often discussed of the torture memos was written by an OLC 
lawyer named John Y oo, an academic who eventually returned to the 
academy and currently teaches law at the University of California. It is 
usually called the "Bybee memo," though, because it was signed by the 
then-head of OLC, Jay Bybee (now a judge on the Ninth Circuit Court of 
Appeals). 
Ethically speaking, the Bybee memo was not the OLC's finest hour.Z0 
It misrepresented what one source said, and it omitted adverse precedents, 
including important Supreme Court precedents and the Fifth Circuit case 
that had labeled waterboarding "torture." If a lawyer did this in a brief, he 
would face professional discipline-and we have seen that the standard of 
honesty is even higher in a legal opinion than in a brief. 
The most famous part of the memo is its test of how severe pain or 
suffering must be to count as torture. According to Yoo, ~ain is not torture 
unless it is equivalent to the pain of organ failure or death. 1 Where did that 
standard come from? The answer is startling: Y oo took it from a Medicare 
statute that has nothing to with torture and was not trying to define severe 
pam. The statute was defining emergency medical conditions, and it 
16. /d. 
17. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340-2340A (2006). There is more to the defmition than this, but I am 
focusing on the definitional core. 
18. Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143, 150 n.6 (1944); id. at 152 n.8 (quoting Enoch v. Com-
monwealth, 141 Va. 411,423 (1925)). 
19. United States v. Lee, 744 F.2d 1124, 1125 (5th Cir. 1984). ·· 
20. This is for reasons I explain at length in LUBAN, supra note 12; Senate Testimony, supra note 
12. 
21. See Memorandum from Daniel Levin, Acting Assistance Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep't of Jus-
tice, Office of Legal Counsel, to James B. Corney, Deputy Attorney Gen. (Dec. 30, 2004), reprinted in 
THE TORTURE MEMOS, supra note 11, at 138 n.l7. 
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includes the common sense criterion that severe pain can be a sign of an 
emergency medical condition. Y oo, in effect, flipped the statute to 
conclude that pain is only severe if it is equivalent to that of an emergency 
medical condition. This reading is fundamentally absurd. In the end, the 
Bybee memo was not only not candid and independent, it was frivolous. 
Eventually, OLC itself repudiated the argument. 22 
But you do not have to take my word for it. Bybee's successor as head 
of OLC was Jack Goldsmith, now a professor at Harvard Law School. 
Goldsmith read the memos and quickly wrote to the Pentagon that it must 
not rely on them. Goldsmith, like John Yoo, is a prominent conservative, 
and nobody thinks this was just a political disagreement. In his book about 
terrorism, Goldsmith criticizes the Bybee memo for "cursory and one-sided 
legal arguments" that have "no foundation in prior OLC opinions, or in 
judicial decisions, or in any other source of law."23 The memo, Goldsmith 
added, "lacked the tenor of detachment and caution that usually 
characterizes OLC work."24 In a blistering comment, Goldsmith charged 
Yoo with providing "get-out-of-jail free cards" to torturers.25 
Eventually the Justice Department launched an internal investigation of 
the memos. An initial report by Department of Justice's Office of 
Professional Responsibility concluded that the Bybee Memo was so flawed 
that Yoo and Bybee should be referred for professional discipline.26 But a 
Justice Department official who reviewed the report downgraded the 
!d. 
22. !d. The repudiation came in a later memo: 
We do not agree with those statements. Those other statutes define an 'emergency medical 
condition,' for purposes of providing health benefits, as 'a condition manifesting itself by 
acute symptoms of sufficient severity (including severe pain)' such that one could reasonably 
expect that the absence of immediate medical care might result in death, organ failure or 
impairment of bodily function. See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1369 (2000); 42 U.S.C. § 1395w-
22(d)(3)(B) (2000); id. § 1395dd(e) (2000). They do not define 'severe pain' even in that 
very different context (rather, they use it as an indication of an 'emergency medical 
condition'), and they do not state that death, organ failure, or impairment of bodily function 
cause 'severe pain,' but rather that 'severe pain' may indicate a condition that, if untreated, 
could cause one of those results. 
23. JACK GoLDSMITH, THE TERROR PRESIDENCY: LAW AND JUDGMENT INSIDE THE BUSH 
ADMrNISTRATION 149 (2007). 
24. ld. 
25. !d. at 97. 
26. Office ofProfl Responsibility, Dep't of Justice, Investigation into the Office of Legal Coun-
sel's Memoranda Concerning Issues Relating to the Central Intelligence Agency's Use of "Enhanced 
Interrogation Techniques" on Suspected Terrorists 260 (July 29, 2009), available at 
http://judiciary.house.gov/hearings/pdf/OPRFinalReport090729.pdf. 
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cnttctsm to "poor judgment. "27 Even so, he agreed that the memo was 
"flawed" and "slanted toward a narrow interpretation of the torture statute at 
every turn. "28 
One more set of testimonies ought to be mentioned. When the 
TJAGs-the heads of each service's JAG corps-learned about the torture 
memos, they were taken by surprise and wrote angry letters of protest.Z9 
They complained that these civilian lawyers did not take the interests of the 
military seriously; one of them wrote that the military prefers to take the 
high road. 30 
So far, I have said nothing about why the Bybee Memo was written 
when it was. OLC wrote the memo in the summer of 2002, less than a year 
after 9111, and at a time when the U.S. government feared an "anniversary" 
attack by Al Qaeda. General Richard Myers, who chaired the Joint Chiefs 
of Staff at the time, recalled that "[t]here was a sense of urgency that in my 
forty years of military experience hadn't existed in other contingencies."31 
By the time the issue reached OLC, the harsh interrogation program had 
been approved at the highest levels of government, including the head of the 
National Security Council, the Vice-President, and the President.32 This 
was a classic case in which the client desperately wanted an opinion that 
gave the green light to the client's preferred course of action-not that Mr. 
Y oo, who defends the opinion to this day, had any apparent qualms about it. 
The watchword of the day for government lawyers was to be "forward-
leaning"33 -meaning legally aggressive-and, in the words of then-
Counterterrorism Director Michael Hayden, government officials should get 
27. Memorandum from David Margolis, Associate Deputy Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep't of Justice, 
to the Attorney Gen., the Deputy Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep't of Justice 68 (Jan. 5, 2010), available at 
http://judiciary.house.gov/hearings/pdf/DAGMargolisMemoiOOI05.pdf. For criticism of this report, see 
David Luban, David Margolis Is Wrong, SLATE (Feb. 22,2010, 11:49 AM), http://www.slate.com/ 
articles/news_ and _politics/jurisprudence/20 I 0/02/david _margo lis _is_ wrong.html. 
28. !d. at 64. 
29. These are reproduced in THE TORTURE DEBATE IN AMERICA (Karen Greenberg ed., 2005). 
30. LUBAN, supra note 12, at 173 (citing Memorandum from Major Gen. Jack L. Rives to the 
Secretary of the Air Force (Feb. 5, 2003), reprinted in THE TORTURE DEBATE IN AMERICA, supra note 
29, at 378). 
31. PHILIPPE SANDS, TORTURE TEAM: RUMSFELD'S MEMO AND THE BETRAYAL OF AMERICAN 
VALUES 88 (2008). 
32. See Sen. John D. Rockefeller IV, Release of Declassified Narrative Describing The Depart-
ment of Justice Office of Legal Counsel's Opinions on the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program 
6-7 (Apr. 22, 2009) (attached to letter from Attorney Gen. Eric Holder to Sen. John D. Rockefeller IV 
(Apr. 17, 2009)), available at http://dspace. wrlc.org/doc/bitstream/2041171 011/031 04display.pdf. This 
report does not mention the President, but President Bush himself has stated in his memoirs that he was 
aware of, and approved, the interrogation program. See GEORGE W. BUSH, DECISION POINTS 169 
(2010). 
33. Tim Golden, After Te"or, a Secret Rewriting of Military Law, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 24, 2004, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2004/10/24/internationaVworldspecial2/24gitmo.html?pagewanted=print. 
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"chalk on our spikes" pushing the law to its limits in the name of national 
security.34 Given the threat, is there anything wrong with that? Without in 
the least bit diminishing the horror of9/11 or the danger posed by Al Qaeda, 
I think the answer is yes. 
All lawyers, I have said, have a duty to give candid and independent 
advice, but executive branch lawyers have an even more powerful 
obligation to play the law straight. Article II of the Constitution obligates 
the President to "take care that the laws be faithfully executed."35 Not just 
executed, but faithfully executed. That word "faithfully" is there to do some 
work. It is a warning that the President, above all, must not try to loophole 
the law-no chalk on his spikes. 
The constitutional obligation to take care that the laws be faithfully 
executed flows down the chain of authority from the President to the 
Attorney General to the Office of Legal Counsel (which is delegated to 
provide Attorney General opinions )-and, indeed, to every lawyer in the 
executive branch. It places them under an even more stringent obligation of 
candor than a lawyer representing a private client. It is an obligation of 
constitutional dimension. The executive branch lawyer is responsible not 
just for a private client, but for the integrity of the laws themselves. 
I am assuming a point that may seem obvious, but deserves discussion: 
that faithful execution of the laws requires faithful interpretation of them. 
That means that faithful interpretation of the laws is the President's 
constitutional obligation, because it belongs to the obligation of faithful 
execution. The attorney general, who provides legal advice to the President, 
and the OLC, which writes the attorney general opinions, inherits that 
constitutional obligation. Might one not reply that faithful execution refers 
solely and by its terms to executing the laws, however interpreted, rather 
than interpreting them faithfully? The answer, I believe, is no. A legal text 
that is unfaithfully interpreted is not the law, so that whatever it is that the 
President faithfully executes, he cannot be said to faithfully execute the law 
unless it is, first of all, faithfully interpreted. 
During the Bush administration, one frequently heard a different 
argument: that the President's most sacred obligation, as set forth in the 
Constitution's Oath Clause of Article II, Section 1, is to "preserve, protect, 
and defend the Constitution of the United States. "36 Great Presidents, 
34. See GoLDSMITH, supra note 23, at 78 ("Michael Hayden, former NSA Director General and 
now the Director of the CIA, would often say that he was 'troubled if [he was] not using the full authori-
ty allowed by law' after 9/11, and that he was going to 'live on the edge,' where his 'spikes will have 
chalk on them."'). 
35. U.S. CONST. art. II,§ 3. 
36. U.S. CONST. art. II,§ 1, cl. 8. 
2012] THE PERILS OF THE GOVERNMENT LEGAL ADVISOR 1051 
including Jackson and Lincoln, invoked the Oath Clause to justify actions 
that might otherwise be regarded as illegal: in Jackson's case, not enforcing 
a statute, and in Lincoln's, suspending habeas corpus.37 Normally, of 
course, the Oath Clause and Faithful Execution Clause reinforce each other 
harmoniously: preserving, protecting, and defending the Constitution is 
consistent with faithfully executing the laws. Normally-but not always. 
What if a national security emergency requires the President to break the 
law? Lincoln famously asked the rhetorical question, "Are all the laws but 
one to go unexecuted, and the Government itself go to pieces lest that one 
be violated?"38 He was responding to the criticism "that one who is sworn 
to 'take care that the laws be faithfully executed' should not himself violate 
them."39 In a national security emergency, perhaps the duty to defend takes 
precedence over faithful execution of law--or so the "Lincolnian" argument 
goes. 
Although this is not the occasion for a full analysis of these 
constitutional clauses, I want to at least indicate why I disagree with the 
Lincolnian argument. I have two fundamental reasons. First, defending the 
Constitution is not the same thing as defending national security. Only if 
the United States faced a truly existential threat to the continued existence 
of its political system-a threat that Lincoln faced, but that Al Qaeda has 
plainly never come near posing-might one argue otherwise. In other 
cases, defending the Constitution means defending a legal structure, and 
that cannot be done by interpreting the laws unfaithfully. Second, the Oath 
Clause does not actually state a constitutional obligation of government-it 
sets out a personal obligation of the president to protect and defend the 
Constitution, but it is an obligation that does not enhance his other 
constitutional powers or negate his obligation to faithfully execute the laws. 
If the Framers had meant to give the President the constitutional authority to 
take extralegal steps to "preserve, protect, and defend the Constitution," 
they could have directly included that authority in the other Article II 
powers enumerated in sections two and three, rather than creating it in a 
roundabout way by building it into the President's oath of office. 
At this point let us resume the story of the torture memos.· What came 
next was an ethical train wreck. Quite apart from the high value Al Qaeda 
prisoners held in secret CIA prisons, there were also prisoners at 
Guantanamo who the government wanted to interrogate harshly. Two 
37. 2 A COMPILATION OF THE MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 576 (James D. Rich-
ardson ed., 1897); 6 A COMPILATION OF THE MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS, supra, at 25. 
38. President Abraham Lincoln, July 4th Message to Congress (July 4, 1861), available at 
http://millercenter.org/president/speeches/detail/3508. 
39. ld. 
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months after the Bybee Memo was written, a group of intelligence officers 
and lawyers held a secret meeting at Guantanamo. One of the lawyers was 
the staff judge advocate to the task force commander at Gitmo; the other 
was chief counsel to the CIA's counter-terrorism center. 
For obvious reasons, we hardly ever find out what happens in secret 
meetings between lawyers and their clients. This one is an exception, 
because in 2008, a United States Senator released the minutes of the 
meeting.40 I am going to quote some excerpts from those minutes. But first 
I want to issue a caution: the CIA counsel claims that he did not say what 
the minutes report him as saying.41 I nevertheless am going to treat the 
minutes as accurate, for two reasons. The first is that nobody else has ever 
come forward to say that the minutes were wrong, including the JAG at the 
meeting, who spoke at length with an author of a book on U.S. torture 
policy.42 The second is more basic: the CIA counsel's objection came six 
years after the meeting in question. In my opinion, nobody, with the most 
honest intentions in the world, can possibly remember what they did not say 
at a meeting that took place six years earlier-especially not someone who 
participated in hundreds if not thousands of meetings during his tenure at 
the CIA. 
It is not my purpose here to launch accusations at individuals, and for 
that reason I am not going to use the lawyers' names. The CIA counsel will 
just be the "CIA counsel," and the staff judge advocate will just be "the 
JAG." 
Soon after the meeting starts, the JAG says to the group, "We may need 
to curb the harsher operations while the [International Red Cross] is around. 
It is better not to expose them to any controversial techniques. '"'3 The CIA 
counsel chimes in that "In the past when the [Red Cross] has made a big 
deal about certain detainees, the [Defense Department] has 'moved' them 
away.'M This is already starting to look more than a little improper. But 
then the real discussion gets going. The CIA counsel briefs the group on the 
law of torture, and he gives what seems to me a fairly accurate summary: 
40. E-mail from Blaine Thomas to Sam McCahon et a!., tbl. 7, at 2 (Oct. 24, 2002, 7:57 PM) 
[hereinafter Counter Resistance Strategy Meeting Minutes], available at http://·.vwwl.urnn.edu/ 
humanrts/OathBetrayed/SASC-08.pdf. 
41. See Letter from Kathleen Turner, Dir. of Legislative Affairs, to Senator Carl Levin, Chair of 
the Senate Armed Forces Comm., and Senator John McCain, Ranking Member of the Senate Armed 
Forces Comm. (Nov. 17, 2008)), available at http://s3.amazonaws.com/propublicalassets/docs/05a 
Fredman_Statement.pdf (containing a statement from Jonathan Fredman). 
42. The book is SANDS, supra note 31. 
43. Counter Resistance Strategy Meeting Minutes, supra note 40, at 3. 
44. /d. 
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[T]orture has been prohibited under international law, but the 
language of the statutes is written vaguely. Severe mental and 
physical pain is prohibited. The mental part is explained as poorly 
as the physical.45 
It is fair enough to say that the torture statutes do not define the term 
"severe." He then continues the briefing in terms that make it obvious that 
he has read the Bybee Memo: 
Severe physical pain [is] described as anything causing permanent 
physical damage to major organs or body parts. Mental torture [is] 
described as anything leading to permanent, profound damage to 
the senses or personality.46 
Neither of these descriptions is in the torture statute, but both are in the 
Bybee Memo. 
And then comes his stunning summary: "It is basically subject to 
perception. If the detainee dies you're doing it wrong.'.47 
As I mentioned, the CIA counsel indignantly denies that he said 
anything of the sort. He points out that the whole purpose of CIA obtaining 
the Bybee Memo was to make sure that how far you could go in 
interrogating a prisoner was not left to a matter of subjective perception. 48 
But consider what the Bybee Memo actually says, which the CIA 
counsel summarized accurately: the legal standard for "severe pain," that is, 
for torture, is pain equivalent to that of organ failure or death. 49 Any 
interrogator trying to use that standard would have to guess how much pain 
he was inflicting, then guess what organ failure might feel like, and then 
compare the two. This is totally a matter of subjective perception. What 
else could it possibly be? More importantly, if everything is legal up to the 
point of pain equivalent to that of organ failure or death-and we assume 
that these are sometimes truly terrible pains-then you do not know you 
have crossed the line unless organs fail or the detainee dies. In this context, 
once you get chalk on your spikes, it is too late. 
Later in the meeting, the CIA counsel discusses the physical effects of 
waterboarding in antiseptically clinical terms, and then he recommends 
exploiting a prisoner's phobias-snakes, insects, and claustrophobia.50 At 
45. ld. 
46. ld. 
47. ld. 
48. See Counter Resistance Strategy Meeting Minutes, supra note 40, at 3. 
49. Seeid. 
50. ld. at 4. 
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this point, he has clearly crossed the line from providing legal advice to 
providing interrogation advice-just as earlier he and the JAG had both 
crossed the line from legal advice to what sounds like a conspiracy to hide 
detainee abuse from the Red Cross. 
At any rate, that is what it sounded like to a criminal investigator in the 
Pentagon, who read the minutes three weeks later and fired off a blistering 
E-mail saying, rather prophetically: "This looks like the kind of stuff 
Congressional hearings are made of."51 He called the discussion about how 
to hide detainee abuse from the Red Cross "beyond the bounds of legal 
propriety," and added that the chillingly clinical discussion of 
waterboarding "would in my opinion; shock the conscience of any legal 
body."52 He concluded: "Someone needs to be considering how history will 
look back at this. "53 
Indeed, someone should have been considering precisely that. 
Regrettably, it was not the two lawyers at the meeting. The problem, it 
seems to me, was that both of them allowed the boundaries between 
themselves and their clients to dissolve. They were no longer exercising 
independent legal judgment. They had turned into enablers. 
This is a standing temptation to government lawyers in settings where 
national security might be at stake. They are part of the team and they want 
to be part of the team, and the stakes are high. Maybe they also feel the 
need to prove they are part of the band of brothers and not simply pencil 
pushers or nay-sayers. Recently Laura Dickinson published an important 
study based on interviews she conducted with JAG officers. The officers 
she interviewed harshly criticized a fellow JAG who failed to report war 
crimes by members of his unit. In their opinion, he ''went native"-"[H]is 
loyalty to the command trumped his ethical duty [in his own mind], ... 
because he was in combat with them. "54 Going native is exactly what a 
lawyer-advisor is never supposed to do. 
The same thing could be said of the CIA counsel and the Guantanamo 
JAG: they "went native." In surprisingly bitter language, the JAG later 
recalled brainstorming meetings she chaired to devise methods to torment 
the detainees; she used vulgar language to describe her sense that the men 
around the table were becoming glassy-eyed and even sexually excited as 
they got new inspirations about neat things to do to make the prisoners 
51. E-mail from Mark Fallon to Sam McCahon, tbl. 7, at I (Oct. 28, 2002, 4:52PM), available at 
http://www l.umn.edu!humanrts/OathBetrayed/SASC-08.pdf. 
52. !d. 
53. /d. 
54. Laura A. Dickinson, Military Lawyers on the Battlefield: An Empirical Account of Interna-
tional Law Compliance, 104 A.J.I.L. I, 26 (2010). 
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suffer.55 She nevertheless went along, and ultimately wrote her own 
"torture memo" to justify what was about to be done. 56 
The result was incredibly harsh treatment inflicted on a detainee named 
Mohammed al-Qahtani. Al-Qahtani was interrogated twenty hours a day 
for forty-eight days out of fifty-four, with time off only when his heartbeat 
fell dramatically and he had to be treated.57 He was subjected to sexual 
humiliations, led around on a leash, stripped naked in front of women, and 
threatened with a military working dog.58 Significantly, all of these 
techniques ended up being used at Abu Ghraib, and they are immortalized 
in the obscene photographs that shamed the United States in the eyes of the 
world. Al-Qahtani was heated up and chilled down and bombarded with 
ear-splitting music and pumped full of liquid from an LV. to make him 
urinate on himself.59 Eventually, President Bush's head of the Guantanamo 
military commissions announced that al-Qahtani's treatment legally 
amounted to torture and therefore he could not be tried. 60 It was the only 
time that a government official ever said on the record that what U.S. 
interrogators did was torture. But that conclusion came far too late. The 
lawyers had fallen into the moral whirlpool with their clients, and instead of 
standing on shore to pull the clients out, they all went down together. 
I want to close by quoting once again from Elihu Root, the famous 
lawyer who said that the client never wants to be told no. What is often 
forgotten is another statement of Root: "About half the practice of a decent 
lawyer consists in telling ... clients that they are damned fools and should 
stop."61 That includes government clients, up to and including Presidents of 
the United States. 
55. The JAG stated, "Who has the glassy eyes? .... You could almost see their dicks getting 
hard as they got new ideas." SANDS, supra note 31, at 63. 
56. See LUBAN, supra note 12, at 182. Her memo is reprinted in THE TORTURE PAPERS: THE 
ROAD TO ABU GHRAIB 229 (Karen J. Greenberg & Joshua L. Drate1 eds., 2005). 
57. See Army Regulation 15-6: Final Report, Investigation into FBI Allegations of Detainee 
Abuse at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba Detention Facility 17-18 (2005), available at http://www.defense. 
gov/news!Jul2005/d20050714report.pdf. 
58. See id. 
59. See SANDS, supra note 31, at 112-62 (details al-Qahtani's torture). 
60. Bob Woodward, Guantanamo Detainee was Tortured, Says Official Overseeing Military 
Trials, WASH. POST, Jan. 14,2009, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2009/0ll 
13/AR2009011303372.html. 
61. 1 PHILIP C. JESSUP, ELIHU ROOT 133 (1938). 
